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ESSAY

China and the Future of
International Adjudication
JULIAN KU†

ABSTRACT
Traditionally, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
shunned participation in international adjudication, preferring to
settle all disputes through direct negotiations. But in the past two
decades, this wholly negative approach to international courts and
arbitration tribunals has begun to shift. In addition to the PRC’s
acceptance and active participation in the Dispute Settlement Body of
the World Trade Organization, the PRC has also accepted limited
jurisdiction for arbitration under the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Despite this shift, the PRC still
follows a policy of strictly limiting its exposure to international
adjudicatory mechanisms. This strategy, which is similar to that
practiced by the United States, suggests that international
adjudication faces difficult prospects in the long term.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of international adjudication is one of the distinctive
features of the international legal order over the past half century.
While states remain the central players in international law and
†
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politics, states increasingly rely upon international judicial
institutions of all kinds to manage and resolve disputes. In the past
two decades the world has witnessed the creation of five new
international criminal tribunals, including the permanent International
Criminal Court. Additionally, the creation of the World Trade
Organization‘s Dispute Settlement Body has strengthened binding
settlements of international trade disputes. Finally, long-standing
international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
have enjoyed a busier docket than at any time in their history.1
The rise of international adjudication has coincided with the rise
of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) as a leading economic and
political power. Since 1978, the PRC‘s economy has grown to
become the second largest in the world. 2 Along with newfound
economic power and influence, the PRC is also an increasingly
important participant in global politics. From its permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council, the PRC has extended its
influence on a number of global issues ranging from climate change
to the intervention into Libya.
As the PRC‘s economic and political influence grows, it also
faces serious international disputes over a wide range of issues. For
instance, the PRC‘s trade policies are sharply criticized by many of
its largest trading partners, including the United States. Similarly,
China‘s territorial claims over Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, and the
South China Sea have the potential to create serious territorial
conflicts with neighboring states.
Traditionally, the PRC has shunned participation in international
adjudication. As one PRC publicist argued in 1958:
Since the subjects of international treaties are
sovereign states, there cannot be a supra-national organ in
international affairs to interpret international treaties and
compel the contracting parties to accept its interpretation.
Consequently, the interpreters of international treaties can
only be the contracting states themselves, and the best

1. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
WRITINGS 24 (2011) (describing ICJ‘s busy docket).
2. Kevin Hamlin & Li Yanping, China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest
Economy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0816/china-economy-passes-japan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.html.
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method of settling this problem is through diplomatic
negotiations.3
Today‘s more globally-integrated PRC, however, is less
categorically hostile to international adjudication. In addition to the
PRC‘s acceptance and active participation in the Dispute Settlement
Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has also begun to
accept limited compulsory jurisdiction for arbitration under the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) and the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea.4
The PRC‘s relationship with international adjudication is part of
a larger conversation about contemporary China‗s engagement with
international law and politics. 5 The PRC‘s relationship with
international law was exhaustively and brilliantly compiled by
Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, but both international law and the
PRC have changed dramatically since their magnum opus was
published in 1974. 6 Legal scholarship in the United States has only
recently directed its attention to the contemporary PRC‘s approach
and impact on international law. 7 The PRC‘s approach to
international law is worthy of a fresh look, if for no other reason than
that the PRC‘s role in world politics has changed so much in the
intervening decades. The rise of the PRC has been so dramatic that
international relations scholars in the United States have increasingly

3. GARY L. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES: THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 132 (1975).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7
CHI. J. INT‘L L. 1, 3 (2006) (―The geopolitics of the future US-China relationship has
received a great deal of attention. Less attention has been directed to another topic—the role
of international law in any future US-China confrontation.‖). See also Henry Gao, China’s
Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker, and Maybe Rule
Maker?, in MAKING GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT 153 (Carolyn
Deere-Birkbeck ed., 2011). There has been very little discussion of China‘s relationship with
international tribunals and courts. But see Dapo Akande, Is China Changing its Views of
International Tribunals?, EJIL TALK (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-chinachanging-its-view-of-international-tribunals/ (―It remains to be seen whether this trend in
investment protection and a greater willingness to engage in advisory proceedings will lead
to a greater acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of international tribunals dealing with
inter-State cases.‖).
6. See generally JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE‘S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974).
7. See, e.g., Posner & Yoo, supra note 5, at 3.
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devoted attention to the PRC‘s replacement of America as the
world‘s leading power.8
This short essay is intended as the first of several contributions
to that larger conversation. This essay focuses on one key aspect of
the PRC‘s contemporary relationship with international tribunals: its
willingness to expose itself to the jurisdiction of independent
international tribunals. Based on a review of existing PRC treaties,
this essay observes that the PRC has carefully chosen to limit its
exposure to international tribunals in two ways. First, the PRC has
generally eschewed any treaty that requires it to submit to the
compulsory jurisdiction of an international tribunal.9 Second, where
the PRC has submitted to such jurisdiction, it has sought to maintain
as much control and influence over the selection of arbitrators or
judges who might be deciding their cases as possible.10 On the other
hand, the PRC has showed a markedly friendlier attitude toward trade
and investment tribunals than toward other kinds of tribunals.11
This pattern of limited involvement in international adjudication
is hardly unique to the PRC; its pattern of limited participation is very
similar to that of another key global power: the United States. These
parallels between American and Chinese participation in international
adjudication may limit the growth and influence of international
adjudication in the long term.
This essay begins by sketching out the history of China‘s
relationship with international tribunals prior to its process of reform
and opening in 1978.12 It will then offer a description of the PRC‘s
contemporary approach to participation in international tribunals. 13
Finally, the essay concludes by speculating about the PRC‘s future
policies, its implications for the future of international adjudication as
a whole, and questions that deserve further research and study.14

8. E.g., MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN
WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER (2009); AARON L. FRIEDBERG, A CONTEST
FOR SUPREMACY: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN ASIA (2011). See
also G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN 342–49 (2011) (addressing China‘s
ascendency as a nonliberal and non-Western alternative to the US led global order). Cf.
JOSEPH NYE, THE FUTURE OF POWER 177–86 (2011).
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part III.
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CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: A HISTORICAL
SKETCH

China‘s historical encounter with the Western system of public
international law began in the middle of the 19th century in the form
of a series of treaties with Western powers. 15 Such treaties, which
guaranteed Western trading rights and imposed certain extraterritorial
protections for Western and Japanese nationals, were later denounced
by Chinese leaders as ―unequal.‖ 16 Despite this suspicion of
international law, China was a founding member of the first two
global efforts to establish a system of international adjudication: the
Permanent Court of International Arbitration and the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ).17 One of China‘s leading jurists,
Wang Chonghui (王寵惠) served as a founding judge of the PCIJ
during its first sessions in 1923 to 1925.18 During this period, China
accepted the jurisdiction of the PCIJ under the Optional Protocol to
the League of Nations. 19 This Protocol gave the PCIJ compulsory
jurisdiction over certain kinds of disputes.20
China was itself the subject of a PCIJ decision relating to its
denunciation of an 1865 treaty with Belgium.21 China had denounced
the treaty, but Belgium, invoking the PCIJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction,
disputed China‘s right to do so.22 In 1927, Belgium won an interim
measure from the PCIJ requiring the Chinese government to preserve
certain protections Belgian nationals enjoyed under the treaty until a

15. For a powerful historical study of the concept of ―unequal treaties‖ in nineteenth
century China see DONG WANG, CHINA‘S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL
HISTORY (2005).
16. Id.
17. MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920–
1942 665–69, 677, 681, 685–86 (1943) (describing China‘s accession to Conventions
requiring compulsory jurisdiction of the PCA and PCIJ and China‘s subsequent role at those
courts).
18. See Ole Spiermann, Judge Wang Chung-hui at the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 5 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 115, 118–19 (2006) (reviewing the work of the PCIJ during
Wang Chung-hui‘s tenure as a deputy justice).
19. See HUDSON, supra note 17, at 685–86.
20. Revised Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, art. 36(2) 2, P.C.I.J.
(ser. D) No. 1, at 13 (4th ed. 1940), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_D/
D_01_4e_edition.pdf.
21. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, Between China and Belgium
(Belg. v. China), Order, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8, at 6–8 (Jan. 8), available at
http://www.icjcij.org/pcij/serie_A/A_08/25_Denonciation_du_traite_sino_belge_Ordonnanc
e_19270108.pdf
22. Id.
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final decision by the PCIJ.23 This decision was a victory for Belgium,
although a final decision was never issued in the case because
Belgium withdrew its application in 1927 after reaching a settlement
with China.24
Despite its somewhat negative experience with international
adjudication, China maintained its membership in the PCIJ and was
an original member of the new ICJ that replaced the PCIJ in 1945.25
As with the PCIJ, a Chinese jurist, Hsu Mo (徐莫), served as one of
the founding judges of the ICJ. 26 The Republic of China (ROC)
government continued its policy of embracing international
adjudication by accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in
1946. 27 The ROC government generally supported other forms of
international adjudication as well, serving as an original member of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and also participating in
the GATT‘s dispute settlement system, although it withdrew in 1950
before ever participating in a dispute under GATT.28
The replacement of the ROC with the PRC on the world stage,
however, ended the first period of China‘s participation in
international adjudication. Unlike the ROC, the PRC initially adopted
23. Id.
24. Ole Spiermann, Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 785,
796 (2007) (citing Belg. v. China, Order, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8, at 6–8 (Jan. 8)).
25. See R.Y. Jennings, The International Court of Justice after Fifty Years, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 493, 493 (1995) (describing the effect of the PCIJ decisions on international law).
26. Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The
Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 209, 250 (2009).
27. 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 18 n.1
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009) (―A declaration recognizing
as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice had been deposited on 26
October 1946 with the Secretary-General on behalf of the Republic of China (registered
under [Art. 36(5)].‖). In 1972, the PRC ―indicated that it does not recognize the statement
made by the defunct Chinese government on October 26, 1946 in accordance with paragraph
2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice concerning the acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.‖ Id. For the text of the Republic of China‘s
declaration, see Declaration of China Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the
Court in Conformity with Article 36, Paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, Oct. 26, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 35, 36.
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-3, T.I.A.S. No 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT]. The history of withdrawal is summarized
in HAROLD K. JACOBSON & MICHEL OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE
WORLD BANK, AND GATT: TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 59–63 (1990); Robert E.
Herzstein, China and the GATT: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China's Participation in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 18 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 371, 402–04
(1986); and Lori Fisler Damrosch, GATT Membership in A Changing World Order: Taiwan,
China, and the Former Soviet Republics, 1992 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 19, 21–24 (1992).
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a policy of non-participation in most international organizations. 29
The PRC effectively denounced the ROC‘s acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction under the ICJ and did not nominate its own member for
that court until 1985.30 This left the ICJ without a Chinese member
for almost 20 years, the only time that a permanent member of the
Security Council has failed to have been represented on the ICJ. 31
The PRC did not join GATT or any of the other major regimes
involving international adjudication for most of its turbulent early
history. This stemmed initially from the PRC‘s alignment with the
Soviet Union, but also from its self-imposed isolation from the
international community while it underwent the Cultural Revolution
in the 1960s and 1970s.32 Cohen and Chiu offer this colorful example
of the PRC‘s then-attitude toward the ICJ and compulsory
jurisdiction:
Imperialism has always considered the general
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to be an important signpost
on the road to universalism . . . . In recent years, American
imperialism has obviously begun to believe that control of
the various countries through the [ICJ] would be to its
advantage . . . .33
II. CONTEMPORARY CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A.

General Trends

Since 1978, the PRC has pursued the ―reform and opening‖
policy in pursuit of greater and faster economic development. 34 One
29. Cf. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 6, at 1289 (―[A]t the height of China‘s
disillusionment over the failure of the League of Nations to act against Japanese aggression,
the Communist regime [in China] announced its hostility to the League [of Nations].‖).
30. Ling Yan, In Memoriam: Ni Zhengyu, 3 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 693, 695 (2004); 1
MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 27 at 18
n.1.
31. Cogan, supra note 26, at 250.
32. For a useful overview of China‘s relationship with international tribunals, see Zhao
Haifeng (赵海峰), Zhongguo yu Guoji Sifa Jigou Guanxi de Jiangzuo (中国与国际司法机
构关系的演进) [Evolution of the Relationship Between China and International Judicial
Organizations], 26 FAXUE PINGLUN (法学评论) [WUHAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 3 (2008)
33. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 6, at 1444 (quoting International Court of Justice—A
Shelter for Gangsters, JEN-MIN JIH-PAO (RENMIN RIBAQ) (人民日报) [PEOPLE‘S DAILY], July
26, 1966, at 6).
34. Chen Su, The Establishment and Development of the Chinese Economic Legal
System in the Past Sixty Years (Xie Zengyi trans.), 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 109, 116 (2009).
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key aspect of the ―opening‖ policy involved opening its domestic
markets to foreign trade and investment while at the same time
exporting products to global markets.35 The PRC‘s gradual ―opening‖
and re-integration into the world economy is accompanied by a need
to pursue a more active role in the international community. As China
re-entered the world economic community, it slowly began to
reconsider its complete separation from systems of international
adjudication. The 1985 nomination of Ni Zhengyu ( 倪 征 奥 ) to
become the PRC‘s first member of the ICJ 36 symbolizes this
reconsideration. The PRC also participated in the ICJ‘s advisory
jurisdiction proceeding on the status of Kosovo.37
The PRC is now party to 571 conventions, 203 treaties, and
2,616 agreements. 38 This represents a substantial change from the
pre-1971 period. Overall, the PRC is currently party to 6,720
different types of international agreements, compared to
approximately 1660 in 1972. 39 China‘s ascension to multilateral
conventions is particularly striking. Since 1971, the PRC has joined
23 U.N. sponsored multilateral conventions. 40 While the PRC‘s
participation in international treaty-making is still less than other
comparable countries (the United States is currently party to 912
conventions),41 there is little doubt that the PRC is now a full-fledged
and active participant in the world of international treaties and
conventions.
Although the PRC now joins treaties with more frequency, it
exercises much more caution when participating in international
dispute resolution. The PRC is party to at least 53 multilateral
conventions that include dispute resolution clauses.42 But, with a few
35. Id.
36. Ling Yan, supra note 30, at 695.
37. See Written Statement of the People’s Republic of China to the International Court
of Justice on the Issue of Kosovo (Apr. 16 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/
15611.pdf.
38. These counts are a result of a key word search for ―公约‖ [conventions], ―条约‖
[treaties], and ―协定‖ [agreements] in the Chinalawinfo database‘s ―中外条约‖ [Sinoforeign agreements] database .
39. These counts reflect all agreements listed in the ―中外条约‖ database. Compare
SCOTT, supra note 3, at 140.
40. These counts generated by a search for ―联合国‖ [United Nations] and ―公约‖
[conventions] in Chinalawinfo database‘s ―中外条约‖ database
41. This list reflects a word search for the term: ―ti(convention!‖)‖ in the USTREATIES
Database in Westlaw.
42. See Table I. This list of treaties was generated by the entering the following search
terms, "联合国,公约,争端,解决" in Chinalawinfo's ―中外条约‖ database. From this list,
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exceptions, none of these provisions require the PRC to accept the
jurisdiction of an international tribunal.43 Many of these treaties grant
international tribunals compulsory jurisdiction, but make acceptance
of such jurisdiction optional.44 The PRC has generally done so in all
such cases.45 Finally, some treaties give a party the option to declare
itself bound to compulsory dispute resolution, and in those cases, the
PRC has uniformly refused to do so.46 Based on this study, the PRC
is party only to nine conventions or agreements (other than bilateral
investment treaties) that require it submit to compulsory dispute
settlement, where the PRC cannot block jurisdiction after a dispute
arises.47
B.

The PRC and Binding Dispute Resolution

Therefore, unlike the ROC, the PRC has generally avoided any
treaties that would obligate it to submit to compulsory dispute
resolution. While this pattern is fairly consistent across treaty subject
matter and time, there are exceptions to this approach. Fairly early in
its history, the PRC entered into a few conventions subjecting it to
binding arbitration.48 In recent years, the most prominent exceptions
to the PRC‘s otherwise cautious pattern are the Convention for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
an individual review of the individual treaty provisions identified those with dispute
resolution provisions.
43. See Table I (collecting treaties with compulsory dispute resolution obligations).
44. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 66(4), opened for
signature Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf (―Any State Party
that has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may at any time
withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.‖).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa art. 28, opened
for signature Oct. 14, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3.
47. This study does not include bilateral investment treaties that grant jurisdiction to
ICSID or other binding arbitration. See infra Part B.1 & note 56.
48. See, e.g., International Telecommunication Convention, opened for signature Nov. 6,
1982, 1533 U.N.T.S. 61 (PRC accession Aug. 19, 1985); 1972 Customs Convention on
Containers, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1973, 988 U.N.T.S. 43 (PRC accession Jan. 22,
1986); International Convention for Safe Containers, opened for signature Dec. 2, 1972,
1064 U.N.T.S. 26 (PRC Accession Dec. 23, 1980); 1969 International Convention Relating
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, opened for signature
Nov. 29, 1969, 970 U.N.T.S. 212 (PRC accession Feb. 23, 1990); Convention on
International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 296 (ratified
Apr. 4, 1947, recognized by PRC Feb. 15, 1974). Treaty information can be found at
http://treaties.un.org, following the ―Title Search‖ hyperlink and then searching by treaty
title.
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Other States, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding.
1.

ICSID Convention

The PRC joined the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID
Convention) in 1990. 49 The ICSID Convention creates the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) as a free-standing arbitration center for investor-state
disputes.50 Although parties must separately give consent to ICSID
jurisdiction in a separate bilateral agreement or treaty, once invoked,
the ICSID Convention binds members to ICSID arbitration
procedures as well as obligations to comply and enforce ICSID
awards. 51 Most importantly, the ICSID Convention rules permit a
non-state party, usually a business corporation, to bring a claim
against the host state directly without having to seek sponsorship
from its home government.52
The most common way ICSID acquires jurisdiction over a state
is in a ―bilateral investment treaty‖ or BIT. 53 Such treaties usually
provide for the protection of foreign investors against expropriation
or other unfair treatment by the host state. 54 Most BITs typically
49. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, China became signatory Feb. 9, 1990, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159,
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (entered into force in China Feb. 6, 1993).
50. For general texts on the ICSID and its constitutive Convention, see JAN PAULSSON ET
AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2001) and CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (2001).
51. ICSID Convention, supra note 49, art. 25(1) (―The jurisdiction of the Centre shall
extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State
. . . and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in
writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may
withdraw its consent unilaterally.‖). Id. art. 26 (―Consent of the parties to arbitration under
this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the
exclusion of any other remedy.‖).
52. See SCHREUER, supra note 50, at 159 (―The idea of granting direct access to an
international forum to a non-State party was one of the Convention‘s avowed purposes. . . .
Some delegates had difficulties with this departure from accepted concepts and wanted to
bring the investor‘s home State into the picture. In response, Mr. Broches pointed to the
advantages of direct dealings between States and investors for both sides.‖) (internal
citations omitted).
53. See id. at 210 (―The Report of the Executive Directors to the Convention . . . refer[s]
to the possibility of a unilateral offer of consent by the host State through its legislation and
the acceptance of that offer by the investor. . . . Consent through BITs has become accepted
practice.‖).
54. See, e.g., infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
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provide for compulsory jurisdiction to ICSID for disputes arising
under the agreement. 55 The PRC added a reservation limiting its
consent to ICSID jurisdiction to disputes over compensation for
expropriation.56
The PRC has been an active and enthusiastic creator of BITs. As
of June 1 2011, the PRC is party to 88 bilateral investment treaties,
most of which provide for investor state arbitration under ICSID.57
Many early PRC BITs do not permit any investor state arbitration at
all.58 Later PRC BITs permit investor-state dispute under ICSID, but
only for questions of compensation for expropriation.59 These early
PRC BITs excluded protection for ―indirect‖ investments. 60 But
beginning in 2001, the PRC has agreed to more expansive investorstate arbitrations covering more than just expropriation and including
other kinds of mistreatment.61 In a proceeding initiated by a Chinese
national against Peru, an ICSID panel held that the most-favored
nation clause of the China-Peru BIT incorporated provisions from
other more recent BITs.62 These provisions allow investors to seek
55. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment (2004 Model BIT), art. 25, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
56. See SCHREUER, supra note 50, at 113 (―China has announced that it ‗would only
consider submitting . . . disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and
nationalisation.‘‖) (quoting Notifications Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered
Suitable or Unsuitable For Submission to the Centre, ICSID/8-D 1).
57. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Total Number of Bilateral investment Treaties
Concluded, 1 June 2011, http://archive.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
58. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Egypt, art. 9, Apr. 21, 1994, 1998 U.N.T.S. 125 (requiring resolution of
investor-state disputes in the competent court of the Contracting Party accepting the
investment).
59. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Peru, art. 8(3), June 9, 1994, 1901 U.N.T.S. 257 (permitting submission
of dispute to ICSID for disputes compensation for expropriation).
60. See Aaron M. Chandler, BITs, MFN Treatment and the PRC: The Impact of China’s
Ever-Evolving Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice, 43 INT'L LAW. 1301, 1310 (2009).
61. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's
Republic of China on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.China, arts. 3–5, Dec. 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253, 272–73, available at http://treaties.un.org
/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202362/v2362.pdf; Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Neth.-China, art. 3,
Nov. 26, 2001, 2369 U.N.T.S. 219, 244–45, available at http://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202369/v2369.pdf.
62. Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Competence dated June 19, 2009, ¶ 190 (unofficial translation) (―Claimant
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remedies for a broad set of state actions well beyond those permitted
by the early PRC BITs.63
The PRC has yet to face a proceeding brought by an investor
against it in ICSID under one of its BITs. 64 But the combination of
the most favored nation clauses in their older BITs along with their
more investor-friendly provisions in the newer BITs will likely
expose the PRC to ICSID arbitration in the near future. 65 Moreover,
ICSID requires states to adopt domestic enforcement measures
through their domestic judiciary, increasing the pressure of the PRC
to comply with an ICSID judgment.66
2.

UNCLOS

China joined the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in 1996.67 UNCLOS is a comprehensive treaty regulating
a wide range of issues including the designation of control over
territorial seas, seabeds, and economic zones. UNCLOS creates a
complex set of options for dispute resolution.
Part XV of UNCLOS offers four options for dispute resolution:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS);
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII; and

ultimately alleges . . . that Peru has signed other BITs which allows the submission of any
disputes between the investor and the host State to ICSID arbitration. Claimant believes that
the same treatment must also be extended to disputes related to violations to fair and
equitable treatment, as well as to protection in the territory in favour of a Chinese investor,
as required by the MFN clause in the Peru-China BIT.‖)
63. Chandler, supra note 60, at 1310.
64. See INT‘L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (ICSID),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ (follow ―Cases‖ hyperlink; then follow ―List of Cases‖ hyperlink; then
follow ―Pending Cases‖ and ―Concluded Cases‖ hyperlinks) (last visited Apr. 11, 2012)

[hereinafter ICSID SEARCH].
65. Cf., Ekran Berhad v. People‘s Repub. China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15, Pending
(July 22, 2011). The proceeding was suspended pursuant to the parties‘ agreement. ICSID
SEARCH, supra note 64.
66. ICSID Convention, supra note 49, art. 54.
67. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA: DECLARATIONS
AND STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA AND TO THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, at 12, U.N., Sales No. E.97.V.3 (2011)
[hereinafter DECLARATIONS & STATEMENTS].
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(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories
of disputes specified therein.68
Both parties must consent to the same procedure for settlement
of disputes.69 If there is no agreement on procedures, then the dispute
must go to binding arbitration. 70 State parties may not, however,
avoid the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS,
which is both compulsory and binding for matters related to the
international seabed.71
State parties, however, may also limit the subject matter of this
compulsory arbitration. Under Article 298, coastal states may exclude
sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles,
certain military or law enforcement activities, or actions pursuant to a
Security Council function from any of the dispute resolution
procedures. 72 The PRC exercised this right upon acceding to the
UNCLOS.73
Thus, while China has a judge who sits on the ITLOS, the
chance of China appearing before the tribunal is quite small since it
would require China‘s consent after a dispute had arisen. Many of
China‘s key disputes with its neighbors involve sea boundary
delimitations or ―historic bays and titles.‖74 Such disputes, including
those involving the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, would
probably be excluded from the jurisdiction of any UNCLOS dispute
resolution method. Even if other non-excluded disputes reached
dispute settlement, China could (and likely would) opt for arbitration
instead of ITLOS, where it would be able to appoint at least one
panel member. While China has appeared before the ITLOS to
68. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 287(4), opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 287(5) (―If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for
the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with
Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.‖). See also id., Annex VII, art. 11 (―The
award shall be final and without appeal, unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in
advance to an appellate procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute.‖).
71. Id. art. 287(2) (―A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected
by the obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the extent and in the manner provided
for in Part XI, section 5.‖). The jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber is laid out in
Art. 187 of UNCLOS.
72. Id., art. 298.
73. DECLARATIONS & STATEMENTS, supra note 67.
74. See UNCLOS, supra note 68, art. 298(1)(a)(i).
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support the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, the entire
proceeding was limited to the Chamber‘s advisory jurisdiction.75
Hence, it is not surprising that recent news reports suggest that
the PRC does not support dispute resolution under ITLOS or
UNCLOS. When the foreign minister of the Philippines suggested
that the two countries settle disputes over the South China Sea at
ITLOS, the PRC firmly refused his proposal.76 China‘s pattern in the
context of UNCLOS is thus consistent: limit binding dispute
resolution as much as possible and opt for arbitration over standing
tribunals.
3.

WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding

In 2001, after a long process of application and negotiation, the
PRC entered into the World Trade Organization. 77 In doing so, the
PRC was obligated to accept the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU).78 The DSU, which was first added to the international trading
regime in 1994, requires all WTO members to accept dispute
settlement before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.79
Unlike most treaty regimes, the DSU is not optional for WTO
members. The PRC‘s accession to the WTO required acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction and, unlike the ITLOS and ICSID system,
the PRC was required to accept panel members whom it did not
appoint and whom could not be PRC nationals.80
Thus, the WTO Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) represents the
most intrusive form of international dispute settlement to which the
PRC has ever agreed. For the first time since it withdrew from the
ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction, the PRC‘s willingness to agree to
75. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities With
Respect to Activities in the International Seabed Area (China), Case No. 17, Written
Statement of China, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/
Statement_China.pdf.
76. Philippines Chides China for Rejecting Tribunal in Sea Dispute, VOA NEWS, July
13, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Philippines-Chides-China-forRejecting-Tribunal-in-Sea-Dispute-125478783.html.
77. World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People‘s Republic of
China of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/
completeacc_e.htm.
78. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
3(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
79. Id.art.1(1).
80. See id. art. 8.
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binding dispute resolution before an independent international
tribunal is perhaps a sign of how important entering the WTO was for
the PRC.
Given the PRC‘s share of world trade, it is not surprising that
China has quickly become an active and frequent party to DSB
proceedings. Since 2002, China has been the respondent in twenty
one proceedings and it has initiated eight of its own proceedings.81
While this level of activity is still far below that of its key trading
partners, 82 these cases are the first international adjudications
involving PRC since Belgium‘s 1927 proceeding in the PCIJ.
Moreover, the PRC‘s 2002 complaint (along with eight cocomplainants) against U.S. steel safeguard measures probably
represented the first time in Chinese history that a Chinese
government has initiated an international dispute resolution
proceeding.83 The PRC has also taken the initiative more often. Since
2008, it has initiated six complaints, most without co-complainants.84
The PRC‘s compliance with reports of the WTO DSB is
equivalent to other leading members. While the PRC previously
avoided panel reports by settling disputes in conciliation and
mediation proceedings, it has taken a markedly more aggressive tone
in the past five years. For example, in 2007, it contested a claim
against its treatment of imported auto parts by the United States,
European Union, and Canada.85 When the panel report ruled against
the PRC, it appealed and lost again.86 It eventually agreed to comply
with the panel report.87 The episode reflects the first time China has
lost a case in an international dispute proceeding, and it is probably

81. See Gao, supra note 5, at 168. Kristie Thomas, China and the WTO Dispute
Settlement System: From Passive Observer to Active Participant? 6 (working paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1866259_code1011460.p
df?abstractid=1866259&mirid=1.
82. The United States was involved in 28 proceedings as complainant and 57 as
respondent and the European Union had similar number (27 and 37). Thomas, supra note 81,
at 6.
83. Panel Report, United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS252/R (July 11, 2003).
84. Thomas, supra note 81, at 11.
85. Panel Reports, China–Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts,
WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, Add.1, Add.2 (Jan. 12 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds342_e.htm
86. Appellate Body, China–Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts,
WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340-/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008).
87. Gao, supra note 5, at 170.
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the first time it complied with a final judgment of an international
tribunal.
Overall, the PRC‘s participation in the WTO DSB is by far
China‘s most extensive experience with international dispute
settlement. Whether as a ―winner‖ or a ―loser‖ of WTO disputes,
China has remained an active participant.
C. Views of PRC Scholars
Contemporary PRC publicists are generally more open to greater
PRC participation in international adjudication than their
predecessors. In a sweeping lecture on China‘s relationship with
international judicial institutions, one scholar approvingly reviewed
China‘s more open and positive attitude toward international judicial
institutions, especially the WTO DSB. 88 Noting that China has
essentially accepted compulsory jurisdiction in the WTO DSB and
other institutions like ICSID, Dean Zhao Haifeng argued that the
PRC ―should open up its attitudes and completely reconsider and
reassess its customarily negative views of international
adjudication.‖89 Indeed, Dean Zhao went so far as to link the PRC‘s
―continuous development of domestic rule of law‖ with the
likelihood that the PRC will eventually change its approach to
international adjudication.90
Other scholars have called upon the PRC government to engage
the ICJ more energetically. 91 Professor Guan Jianjun has
recommended that the PRC accept the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction
in the context of particular multilateral treaties and consider utilizing
the ICJ‘s special chamber procedures.92 But this positive attitude is
tempered by a healthy dose of realism. Another scholar, noting that
other great powers prefer to avoid international adjudication, has
suggested the PRC carefully study the motivations and actions of
88. See Zhao Haifeng, supra note 32, at 12.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Wang Yong (王勇) & Guan Zhengfeng (管征峰), Wushiwu nian lai
Zhongguo dui Guoji Fayuan Susong Guanxiaquan de Taidu zhi Shuping (五十五年来中国
对国际法院诉讼管辖权的态度之述评) [Review of China's Attitude toward the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the past 55 Years], HUADONG ZHENGFA
DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) 22 [J.E. CHINA UNIV. POL. SCI. & L.] 72, 74–75 (2002)
(arguing for a limited acceptance of the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction).
92. See Guan Jianjun (管建军), Guoji Fayuan de ―Fuxing‖ yu Woguo zhi Yingdui,(国际
法院的“复兴” 与我国之应对) [―Renaissance‖ of the International Court of Justice and
the Response of Our Country], FAXUE (法学) [LEGAL SCI. MONTHLY], Apr. 1996, at 11.
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such powers before committing itself to international adjudication.93
Similarly, Professor Guan recommends against the PRC‘s acceptance
of the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction until all five permanent members
of the Security Council also accept do the same.94
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The PRC‘s pattern of participation in international dispute
settlement represents a shift from the PRC‘s early years. 95 But it
remains a far cry from the more aggressively internationalist
approach adopted during the ROC period.96 This concluding section
speculates briefly about China‘s future policy and impact on
international adjudication.
A.

China’s Future Policy Toward International Adjudication

As this brief study has suggested, the PRC‘s post-reform
engagement with international adjudication is significant. Since 1978,
China has entered into numerous treaties that would allow the PRC to
submit disputes to arbitration. Most importantly, it has subjected
itself to three international treaty regimes—ICSID, UNCLOS, and
the WTO DSB—that could require the PRC to submit to involuntary
international adjudication. 97 This trend is also reflected in the
generally positive view of international dispute resolution among
PRC scholars and publicists.
Yet it would be too hasty to declare that the PRC is ready to
become a regular supporter of international adjudication. The PRC
continues to avoid (when possible) most compulsory dispute
resolution provisions. It has maintained its avoidance of compulsory
jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice. It has been a critic of
the International Criminal Court‘s attempt to define the crime of
―aggression‖ at its recent conference in Kampala, Uganda.98

93. See Su Xiaohong (苏晓宏), Daguo Weishenme Buxihuan Guoji Sifa (大国为什么不
喜 欢 国 际 司 法 ) [Why Great Powers Dislike International Adjudication], LEGAL SCI.
MONTHLY, Nov. 2003, at 8.
94. See Wang Yong & Guan Zhengfeng, supra note 91, at 11.
95. See supra Part I.
96. See supra Part I.
97. See supra Part II.
98. Int‘l Crim. Ct. [ICC], Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, at 125, ICC Doc. RC/11 (May 31-June 11, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-11-ENG.pdf.
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What then should we make of the PRC‘s willingness to join the
ICSID, UNCLOS, and WTO DSB systems? In my view, the PRC‘s
willingness to subject itself to the WTO DSB is simply a price of
admission to the WTO. It is worth noting that when given an
opportunity, the PRC will always choose the most limited
compulsory jurisdiction possible, as it did in the UNCLOS system.
There is little evidence in the PRC‘s pattern of participation in
international adjudication will shift so that it will willingly subject
itself to compulsory jurisdiction if there is any way for it to avoid
doing so.
B.

Implications for International Adjudication

The PRC‘s approach has important consequences for the
continued development of international courts and tribunals. As a
leading political and legal power, the PRC‘s limited and cautious
approach to international adjudication will likely have spillover
effects on other countries. A few possibilities follow.
First, the United States has a very similar approach to
international adjudication as China. The United States has, like the
PRC, withdrawn from the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction. 99 Unlike
China, the United States has not acceded to UNCLOS, but if it did, it
would most likely exclude sea boundaries and military activities from
any UNCLOS forum‘s jurisdiction. 100 The United States has made
clear that it will not agree to any cases heard in the ITLOS and
instead will opt for arbitration.101
On the other hand, like the PRC, the United States is an active
participant of the WTO DSB system. The United States is one of the
most active members of the WTO DSB system, as well as one of the
most the most frequently targeted.102 Similarly, the United States is
an active supporter of the ICSID Convention system by making
submission to ICSID arbitrations standard features of its BITs 103 and
99. Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 80 AM. J. INT‘L L. 151, 163–65 (1986) (describing the U.S. withdrawal
from jurisdiction of the ICJ during the course of proceedings brought by Nicaragua against
the United States).
100. But see S. REP. NO. 110-9, at 9 (2007) (recommending U.S. accession to UNCLOS).
101. Id. at 19.
102. JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20088, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO): AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010) (―Approximately onehalf of the 405 WTO complaints involve the United States as complaining party or
defendant.‖).
103. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 55.
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acceding to ICSID in many of its free trade agreements. 104 Hence,
like the PRC, the United States has shown a striking preference for
international adjudication for economic issues while avoiding and
sometimes decrying international adjudication in other contexts.
Moreover, like the PRC, the United States has preferred arbitration
systems, where it has the power to appoint at least one arbitrator, over
stand-alone international courts.105
The similarity between the American and Chinese approaches to
international adjudication matters because both countries exercise
outsized influence on global affairs. The unwillingness of two of the
world‘s largest economic and military powers to submit noneconomic matters to international adjudication will limit the
effectiveness of international courts like the ICC and the ICJ. Instead,
it is possible that countries, following the PRC and U.S. examples,
will increasingly resort to arbitral mechanisms over judicial ones. It is
also possible that other countries will eschew international
adjudication altogether for most non-economic disputes. In any event,
if the PRC‘s approach remains the same as it is today, it is unlikely
that the United States will alter its policies to become friendlier
toward international adjudication. Indeed, China‘s participation in the
UNCLOS, and its possible manipulation of international
adjudication, is already being used as an argument against U.S.
ratification of the treaty.106
To be sure, how international adjudication will develop in the
future is hard to predict. This study suggests a number of areas of
important research to further analyze this question. For instance, the
PRC‘s domestic enforcement of international tribunal judgments will
reveal more evidence of its seriousness toward international
adjudication. Similarly, the PRC‘s aggressive promotion of its judges
to international tribunals, including ones to which it does not grant
104. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, art.
1135, 32 I.L.M. 289, 646 (1993).
105. This strategy of preferring arbitration over independent courts has been theorized by
some scholars to actually enhance the prospects for resolving international disputes. See
generally Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005). This view has been criticized. See generally Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors
Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL L. REV. 899 (2005). It is striking, however, that both China and the
United States seem to prefer these kinds of less independent tribunals.
106. See John Bolton & Dan Blumenthal, Time to Kill the Law of the Sea Treaty—Again,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2011, at A15 (―If the Senate ratifies the treaty, we would become
subject to its dispute-resolution mechanisms and ambiguities.‖).
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jurisdiction, may reveal its attitude about the significance of those
tribunals as players in world politics. The U.S. reaction to the PRC‘s
approach also bears further consideration.
In any event, the one safe prediction is that, for better or for
worse, the PRC will play a key role in shaping the future of
international adjudication.

